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De-Fanging the MAI
Mark Vallianatos*
Introduction
A Dutch bank merging with a German bank, Japanese timber companies
logging forests in Canada, and U.S. mutual funds acquiring shares of South
Korean companies - all are forms of foreign investment, which involves
the international movement of money and the expansion of corporations
that link the world into an increasingly global economy. Every year, bil-
lion-dollar investments draw these links closer. These investments affect
people's lives, work experience, and the natural environment.
While each nation regulates foreign investments according to its own
societal needs, foreign investors generally prefer a uniform international
regulation of investments instead of facing incongruous national treat-
ments. Currently, there are only a few uniform international rules on how
governments can regulate foreign corporations. The Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment' (MAI) may soon fill in this void.
Since 1995, the twenty-nine governments of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been negotiating the
MAI. If completed, membership will be open to all nations. Developing
countries that did not participate in the MAI negotiation may feel com-
pelled to sign the MAI. When competing for foreign investments, develop-
ing nations may view the MAI as a "seal of approval" that would attract
foreign corporations.
The MAI would change the existing balance of power between govern-
ments and their citizens on the one hand and large multinational corporate
investors on the other. Under the MAI, these corporations will receive new
legal privileges that are designed to deter governments from enacting laws
that would interfere with investments. The MAI would allow foreign inves-
tors to sue governments for monetary damages in special international cor-
porate courts. The MAI would also give foreign investors the power to:
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- invest and operate under terms that are equal to, and sometimes better
than, those enjoyed by local companies;
- operate free of performance requirements, such as requirements to take
a local partner, hire a minimum number of employees, or transfer
technology;
- freely transfer money in and out of a country;
- be compensated when a government takes the investor's assets, both
when property is actually expropriated and when regulations have the
"equivalent effect"2 of taking assets; and
- enjoy the MAI's rules for a minimum of twenty years, even if a country
withdraws from the agreement.
The MAI, however, does not require investors to operate in an environmen-
tally or socially responsible manner. Citizens of countries that sign the
MAI are not given rights to monitor foreign investments or hold investors
accountable.
This Article analyzes many of the MAI's provisions and identifies areas
of concern. Where appropriate, this Article offers suggestions for textual
changes. Part I of this Article discusses the scope and application of the
MAI. Specifically, this Part examines the MAI's broad definition of the
term "investment" and its adverse economic implications. Part II addresses
the relationship between host nations and foreign investors under the MAI.
This part pays particular attention to how the host nations may be required
to treat foreign investors more favorably than domestic investors. Part III
looks at the MAI's attempt to protect foreign investments and the collateral
problems that this protection may cause in the host nation. Part IV criti-
ques the MAI's dispute resolution procedures and offers suggestions to
minimize the loopholes.
I. Scope and Application
A. Definition of Investment
The MAI defines the term "investment" too broadly. By covering "[e]very
kind of asset,"3 the definition extends beyond direct investment and
includes such forms of investment as portfolio investment, intellectual
property rights, and concession rights. These forms of non-direct invest-
ment raise a series of policy concerns. The MAI is not the correct forum
for resolving these concerns and should focus exclusively on direct
investments.
By covering investments that are indirectly controlled by a signatory
nation, the MAI extends its benefits to investors from non-member coun-
tries. According to MAI's commentary, there is wide support for covering
an "investment by an investor established in another MAI Party, but owned
2. Id. art. IV(2.1).
3. Id. art. II (Definitions) (2).
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or controlled by a non-MAI investor."4 This provision may encourage
investors from non-MAI nations to set up shell corporations in MAI mem-
ber countries to take advantage of MAI benefits.
Likewise, there is wide support to define the term "investment" to
include investments "by an investor established in a non-MAI Party, but
owned or controlled by an investor of a third MAI Party."5 This definition
would enable investors from non-MAI nations to enjoy MAI benefits simply
by forming joint ventures with investors from MAI member countries. This
broad interpretation of the term "investment" will enable almost any corpo-
ration to benefit from, and have legal standing under, the MAI. Accord-
ingly, the definition of investment should exclude indirect investments
made by investors from non-MAI countries, given that non-member nations
are not bound by the MAI's environmental, labor, or corporate obligations.
1. Portfolio Investments
The inclusion of portfolio investment raises particular concerns. The
MAI's broad definitions do not distinguish between foreign direct invest-
ment and portfolio investment. Direct investment and portfolio investment
have distinctive characteristics and require different regulations. Direct
investors acquire significant percentages of a company to gain managerial
control. Portfolio investment, on the other hand, is a passive strategy by
which the investor purchases equities (stocks and bonds) as part of an
investment portfolio. Portfolio investors do not control or manage the com-
panies they invest in. Rather, they provide capital in exchange for divi-
dends, interests, and a possible increase in share price. This lack of
commitment to any economic activity makes portfolio investment more liq-
uid and volatile than direct investment.
Portfolio investment in developing countries is a recent phenomenon.
Non-existent in the early 1980s, annual flows of portfolio equity to the
developing world have risen from around $3 billion in 19.90 to $40 billion
in 1996.6 Since 1989, sixty new stock markets have opened around the
world.7 Developing countries seek capital infusion by opening their mar-
kets to foreign investors. From 1991 to 1994, the percentage of emerging
stock markets classified by the World Bank as giving "free entry" to foreign
investors rose from twenty-six percent to fifty-eight percent.8 The lure of
emerging markets is evidenced by the explosive growth of emerging market
funds "from $1.9 billion in 1986 to $10.3 billion in 1989 to $132 billion by
4. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the MAI Negoti-
ating Text art. I (Definitions)(Investment)(2)(A) (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm>.
5. Id. art. II(Definitions)(Investment)(2)(c).
6. JOHN CAVANAUGH & SARAH ANDERSON, INTERNATIONAL FINANcIAL FLOWS: THE NEW
TRENDS OF TE 1990S AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 6 (1997).
7. Brett Fromson, Stock Markets - and Potential Investor Pitfalls - Blooming Globally,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at H2.
8. WORLD BANK, PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING CoUNTmRIES: THE ROAD TO
FINANCIAL ITrEGRATION 102 (1997).
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the middle of 1996."9
The MAI should not define investment to include these short-term and
speculative investments. Speculative portfolio investments can have dis-
ruptive economic and social effects, particularly in emerging markets. One
way to avoid speculation would be to set a minimum time frame, of one or
two years, before the MAI would cover such investments. To enjoy the
MAI's protection, foreign investors would have to maintain their invest-
ments in a country for more than the requisite duration.
2. Intellectual Property Rights
International legal protections of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) raise
many social and environmental concerns. These concerns touch upon
issues such as genetic engineering, biodiversity, patents, transfer of envi-
ronmental technology, and plant-based drugs. Moreover, investors could
use goodwill and business reputation, as components of IPRs, to challenge
government statements and legislative debates on these issues. It is doubt-
ful that the MAI negotiations can fully account for these complex issues.
The MAI's definition of investment should therefore exclude IPRs.
3. Concession Rights
Concessions, licenses, and permits for the development and exploitation of
natural resources 10 often involve national and local management of natural
resources. At times, a government may need to restrict an investor's access
to resources as a means of conservation or to favor its citizens when
exploitation rights are granted. The MAI's definition of investment should
thus exclude natural resources concessions.
B. Geographical Scope of Application
Given the sensitivity of marine ecosystems, the threats posed by off-shore
economic activity, and worldwide depletion of marine resources, the MAI
should only apply to a nation's land territories by default. The MAI should
apply to territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and other maritime areas only
if contracting parties expressly agree to extend the MAI's coverage.
Applying the MAI beyond land territories could conflict with the
rights of states under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Con-
vention), which deals with almost all areas of ocean use.11 The LOS Con-
vention is instrumental in maintaining international peace and security.
Fisheries disputes are often historically and politically charged. These dis-
putes have become increasingly common as a result of the severe decline in
world fish stocks. The Convention helps to resolve many complex, and
often bitter, ocean resource disputes.
9. Id. at 16.
10. These include, for example, fishing rights, timber concessions, and mining
concessions.
11. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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The MAI could conflict with important fishery rights that the LOS
Convention confers upon coastal states. Coastal states have sovereign
rights for conserving and managing all natural resources in their exclusive
economic zones (EEZs). 12 Each coastal state determines its catch capacity
but has to make the surplus available to other states.13 The Convention
takes into account the special needs of land-locked, geographically disad-
vantaged, and developing states in the region. 14 Foreign nationals fishing
in the EEZ must comply with the coastal state's laws and regulations.15
These measures often involve nationality-based discrimination, thereby
conflicting with the MAI's national treatment provision 16 and its prohibi-
tion on performance requirements.
17
C. Application to Overseas Territories
Territories are typically islands with small economies and ecosystems.
Given their small size, large scale foreign investments can have a tremen-
dous impact on these territories. The MAI should therefore require con-
tracting parties to obtain the consent of territorial residents through a
decision of a representative body or a referendum.
II. Treatment of Investors
A. National Treatment
One of the main standards of the MAI is "national treatment,"'18 which
requires countries to treat foreign investors the same as local investors.
National treatment, along with the corollary principle of most favored
nation treatment, form the bedrock principles of economic integration in
international law. Unlike most of the bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
the MAI requires governments to provide national treatment during the
market entry phase of foreign investment.19 Whereas the vast majority of
BITs apply national treatment only after an investor has gained market
access. This transforms the MAI into a top-down agreement, essentially
eliminating national borders for the purposes of investment.
1. Environmental Concerns
National treatment may make it more difficult to combat environmental
degradation. A nation may wish to impose different obligations on foreign
investors to minimize environmental harms. 20 Some countries limit invest-
12. Id. art. 56:1.
13. Id. art. 62:2.
14. Id. art. 62:3.
15. Id. art. 62:4.
16. Discussed infra in Part II.A of this Article.
17. Discussed infra in Part 1I.B of this Article.
18. See generally MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 1, art. III(National Treatment and
Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(1)-(3).
19. Id.
20. For example, the host nation may wish to prevent the foreign investor from prac-
ticing cut-and-run investments in its timber industry.
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ments in the toxic waste disposal industry to domestic companies. They
fear that, if a foreign investor owns a waste facility, it could be difficult for
the host country to keep toxins produced abroad from being imported into
the country without violating the foreign investor's rights to trade with
subsidiaries.
The MAI might interfere with efforts to reorient the world's economy
in a more environmentally friendly direction. To achieve a sustainable
environment, nations must consume natural resources at a rate that is
below the earth's carrying capacity. The MAI's open access regime would
allow rich countries to live beyond their borders, consuming more than
their share of land, wood, minerals, and other resources. Because breaking
this cycle will require more controls on international investment, the MAI's
liberal approach to international investment is undesirable from an ecologi-
cal point of view.
2. Cultural Concerns
Countries that are in favor of a cultural carve-out 21 of national treatment
claim that there are some realms of human activity that one cannot entrust
to market forces. Many OECD members have claimed country-specific res-
ervations for print and broadcast media, as well as for programs that pre-
serve the cultural heritages of indigenous peoples.22 The MAI's national
treatment clause, as presently drafted, would require nations to open up
their cultural sectors to unfettered foreign competition. The MAI requires
the host nation to grant foreign investors "treatment no less favorable" 2
3
than those given to domestic firms. This requirement hampers the host
nation's ability to protect its cultural industries.
To ameliorate the aforementioned problems, this Article suggests the
following amendments:
- To bring the national treatment language in line with the MAI's non-
binding treatment of investor obligations and environmental safe-
guards, "shall"24 should be replaced with "should" or with "shall
endeavor to" in the MAI's section on national treatment.
- The national treatment standard should be changed to encourage equal
treatment of foreign investors without promoting their preferential treat-
ment. Therefore, the "no less favorable" 25 requirement should be
changed to a standard of "no less favorable or no more favorable."
- The phrase "in like circumstances" 26 should be retained as a qualifier to
the national treatment obligation, accompanied by explanatory lan-
21. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 1, annex l(Culture).
22. As of February 16, 1998, Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, South
Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
United States have submitted country specific reservations for cultural industries or
programs.
23. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 1, art. III(National Treatment and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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guage clarifying that differential effects of regulations do not translate
to a violation of national treatment.
- Of the list of activities to which national treatment applies, the terms
"acquisition"2 7 and "sale or other disposition" 28 raise particular issues
of absentee ownership, differential scale of foreign investment, and
other sensitive issues. These two terms should be excluded from the
national treatment requirement, which should be limited to equivalent
treatment of investors' operations.
B. Performance Requirements
The performance requirement section 29 illustrates how the MAI might give
foreign companies better than equal treatment. Under the MAI, govern-
ments cannot require foreign corporations to meet certain performance
requirements or conditions, even if these conditions are imposed on local
companies.30 Prohibited performance requirements include requiring cor-
porations to take on a local partner, to hire a certain number of local peo-
ple, or to transfer environmentally beneficial technology to the government
or local companies.
Performance requirements are important economic development tools
for industrialized and developing nations alike. They are the kinds of poli-
cies that can ensure that communities benefit directly from foreign invest-
ment. Accordingly, the performance requirement section should be
amended as follows:
- Given the non-binding nature of the MAI's provisions on environmental
protection and investor behavior, paragraph 1 should read "A Con-
tracting Party should not (or shall endeavor to)."
- The section should not apply to investors of "a non-Contracting
party,"3 1 whose government and investors are not bound by any of the
MAI's rules on the environment, labor, or investor behavior.
- The section should only apply to requirements imposed by legislation,
not to any "commitment or undertaking." 32 The MAI should not
unduly alter the balance of bargaining power between governments and
investors by barring performance requirements agreed upon as part of
an overall contractual relationship.
- Alternatively, if the above changes were not to be made, performance
requirements should be optional for developing countries that wish to
accede and only be subject to most favored nation obligations.
The following categories of performance requirements are particularly
sensitive and should therefore be excluded from the ban as priority
amendments:
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally id. art. IlI (Performance Requirements)(1)-(5).
30. Id.
31. Id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1).
32. Id.
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- Technology Transfer.33 From an environmental point of view, banning
technology transfer could deprive developing countries of access to
clean and new technology. The international community has developed
in the last thirty years a consensus on the critical role that technology
transfer plays in sustainable development. MAI provisions will reduce
the bargaining power of developing countries to encourage technology
transfer on favorable terms and will ultimately harm current efforts
towards sustainable development.
- Employment of Local Personnel.34 It is especially inappropriate for the
MAI to restrict local hiring requirements.
- Joint Ventures35 and Minimum Local Equity Participation.3 6 Both types of
requirements can help limit the negative effects of absentee ownership
by ensuring local participation in management and profit-sharing with
the community.
Additionally, this Article offers the following recommended changes
to the section on the environmental exception to performance
requirements:
3 7
- The phrase "Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary
or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on
investment" 38 should be removed from the environmental exception to
the MAI's ban on domestic content requirements and local purchasing
requirements. This language would allow excessive scrutiny.
- The phrase "necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations
that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,"39
should be removed. It could be interpreted as being the equivalent of a
"least investment restrictive" test, thereby undercutting the govern-
ment's ability to protect the environment based on its own judgment
and priorities.
C. Privatization
Privatization involves the sale of public assets or functions to private inves-
tors. Governments privatize to raise money or because they think some
state-owned enterprises would run more efficiently if they were privately-
owned. Privatization is big business, with global sales of government
enterprises approaching $100 billion annually. 40
In today's global economy, purchasing privatized enterprises is a key
avenue of expansion for multinational corporations. A significant portion
of privatization deals involve foreign investors. Forty-two percent of assets
privatized in developing nations from 1988-1994 were purchased by for-
33. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(f).
34. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)0).
35. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(k).
36. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(1).
37. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(4).
38. Id.
39. Id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(4)(a).
40. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL MARICET
TRENDS No. 66 (Mar. 1997).
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eign investors. 41 From 1989 to 1993, privatization deals accounted for sev-
enteen percent of foreign direct investment in Latin America, sixty percent
in Central and Eastern Europe, but only two percent in East Asia.42
The decision of whether or how to privatize is politically sensitive and
often controversial. Given that the impacts of privatization can vary from
case to case, governments should retain maximum flexibility when devis-
ing privatization plans. Some countries privatize public assets through
methods that give workers and management or the general public the first
opportunity to buy stock to broaden ownership and share profits widely.
Common methods of ensuring, wide ownership of privatized companies
include: (1) reserved shares for the public and small investors; (2)
employee or management buyout schemes, whereby workers and manage-
ment at state enterprises are sometimes given the first opportunity to raise
the money to buy a privatized company or factory; and (3) retention of a
"golden share," whereby governments, having gone through a detailed pro-
cess to find the right buyer, keep the right to veto a subsequent sale of the
company to an inappropriate purchaser.
Governments should retain the right to privatize public assets in ways
that protect the public interest. This flexibility not only achieves goals of
social justice, but also allows smoother economic transition and can be
critical in creating public acceptance of privatization processes. The MAI
should not restrict privatization mechanisms that seek to guarantee broad
distribution of ownership. For this reason, the MAI should adopt rules that
combine paragraph 1(a) on voucher schemes and alternatives 1 and 4 of
paragraph 3 on special share arrangements. 43 In addition, the MAI's rules
on privatization should not apply to "subsequent transactions involving a
privatized asset."44
II1. Investment Protection
A. General Treatment
The general treatment provisions 45 could be subject to abuse because they
are so general and broad. The phrases "fair and equitable treatment" 46 and
"full and constant protection and security"47 either duplicate the MAI's
specific provisions on treatment and protection or create an open-ended set
of new rights for foreign investors. In either case, the phrases should be
eliminated.
The requirement for "treatment no less favorable than required by
international law"48 should also be eliminated. The use of the words
41. WORLD BANK, supra note 8, at 102.
42. UNITED NATIONS CENTER ON TRADE Am DEvELoPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 18 (1995).
43. See MAd Negotiating Text, supra note 1, art. III(Privatisation)(1), (3).
44. Id. art. III(Privatisation)(1)(b).
45. See generally id. art. IV(I)-(7).
46. Id. art. IV(1.1).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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"international law" without further explanation could be interpreted as
referring to other international agreements that set standards but lack
investor-state dispute resolution. If so, the MAI could become a means of
private enforcement of a wide range of international legal principles and
instruments. In the event that these general treatment standards are
retained, the following changes should be made:
- Change "shall" to "should" or "shall endeavor to."
- Add "as defined by the provisions of this agreement" at the end of the
first sentence.
- Define "international law" through a closed list of specific international
legal principles relating to foreign investment.
The second standard on "unreasonable or discriminatory" 4 9 treatment is
an open door for deregulatory efforts. This standard should be removed
from the MAI. In the event that it is retained, "shall" should be changed to
"should" or "shall endeavor," and "unreasonable" should be eliminated.
B. Expropriation and Compensation
1. Expropriation
Under the MAI, governments that expropriate an investor's property must
pay the market price of the property in return.50 However, problems arise
with terms like "indirect" expropriation and "measures having the
equivalent effect"5' of expropriation. For example, in the United States,
there is a lack of consensus on the application and scope of "regulatory
takings," a U.S. term for expropriation, with respect to environmental regu-
lations. The MAI's broad definition of expropriation, which includes indi-
rect expropriation, might permit foreign investors to challenge U.S.
environmental regulations.
To reduce the risk that the MAI expropriation section will be inter-
preted as including "regulatory takings," this Article offers the following
suggestions:
- Change "expropriate or nationalize directly or indirectly... or take any
measure or measures having equivalent effect"5 2 to "expropriate or
nationalize directly."
- Clarify that regulations affecting an investor's use of its investment are
not direct expropriations unless the regulations take ownership or con-
trol away from the investor or leave an investor with no use for the
investment.
- Add the language from the section on taxation, which reads: "A mea-
sure would not be expropriatory if it was in force and was transparent
when the investment was undertaken."
53
49. Id. art. IV(1.2).
50. See id. art. IV(2.1).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. VIII(2), n.3(c).
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- Add language stating that expropriation provisions shall not protect for-
eign investment's dictatorial regimes when successive democratic gov-
ernments regulate or redistribute state assets.
2. Compensation
Compensation for expropriation should not take precedence over financial
liabilities owed by an investor to a contracting party. To prevent an investor
from claiming expropriation as a means of avoiding liabilities, no claim of
expropriation should be accepted under the MAI until the investor has met
all the obligations required by the laws of the host nation.
C. Transfers
Long-term foreign investments contribute to the host nation's stable eco-
nomic growth. Short-term capital speculations, on the other hand, could
destabilize the host nation's economy. The MAI gives foreign investors the
right to freely enter markets, buy short-term portfolio investments, and
withdraw their money. This combination restricts the host country's abil-
ity to deal with speculative investments, whereby foreign money can pour
into a hot market, then quickly pull out when the economy cools down.
The recent economic crisis in Asia demonstrates the risks of rapid and
unstable foreign capital transfers. Many economists and policy-makers
have called for more regulation of capital flows to reduce the risks of eco-
nomic destabilization. However, the MAI prevents countries from adopting
and implementing strategies that prevent capital flight. Specifically, the
MAI prohibits host nations from imposing limits on currency convertibil-
ity54 and imposing "speed bumps" to encourage long-term investments.
In addition, the MAI could bar the use of certain strategies designed to
limit inflows of foreign investment. Specifically, the MAI could prevent the
host nation from: (1) imposing a ceiling on foreign borrowing by domestic
banks;55 (2) imposing a reserve requirement for portfolio investment;5 6 (3)
withholding government-subsidized insurance for the bank deposits of for-
eign investors;' 7 (4) requiring administrative permission for a foreign bond
issue and imposing minimum maturity periods for foreign bond issues;'
8
and (5) imposing a less favorable exchange rate on the capital transactions
of foreign investors.
5 9
To minimize the dangers of destabilizing capital flights, this Article
proposes the following changes to the transfer provision:
6 0
- Change "shall ensure"6 1 to "should ensure" or "shall endeavor to
ensure."
54. See id. art. IV(4.2).
55. See id. art. III(National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(1).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. art. IV(4).
61. Id. art. IV(4.1).
Cornell International Law Journal
- Remove the word "freely" from the phrase "may be freely transferred
into and out of its territory without delay."
62
- Remove "without delay" from the phrase cited above.
- Eliminate category "a"63 - initial capital and additional amounts to
maintain/increase investment. Payments of capital raise concerns both
for inwards and outwards transfers (disinvestment). Governments
should be able to condition and control disinvestment. Excessive
inward transfers can be a source of financial instability. Capital con-
trols on inflows are common policy tools and they should not be
affected by the MAI.
- Eliminate category "b"64 - returns. A common criticism of some forms
of absentee ownership is insufficient reinvestment of profits and other
returns in the host community. Communities may seek to require rein-
vestment of a portion of returns as a protective measure, in which case
the MAI should not create a special exemption for foreign investors.
VI. Dispute Settlement
A. State-State Procedures
The MAI's dispute resolution process does not permit private citizens to
dispute cases, nor does it allow private citizens or their governments to use
the MAI's dispute procedures to sue foreign investors. The MAI's dispute
resolution process is one sided: it only enforces an investor's interests.
The MAI modeled its state-to-state dispute procedures after those of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The experience at the WTO indi-
cates a structural bias against environmental conservation laws of individ-
ual nations. In each of the disputes involving national regulation of the
environment or natural resources, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) has ruled against national regulations. To reduce such a bias, this
Article recommends the following amendments to the MAI's dispute resolu-
tion mechanism.
1. Consultations
Requests to the party group to consider a dispute, and recommendations
made by the party group to the contracting parties in disputes, should be
made publicly available. Written factual representations produced during
consultations should also be made publicly available. Any mutually
agreed-upon solution to consultations should be made public at the time
that the parties group is informed of the solution.
2. Arbitration
The MAI provides that parties may not initiate proceedings for a dispute
that its investor has submitted to arbitration.65 From the point of view of
62. Id.
63. Id. art. IV(4.1)(a).
64. Id. art. IV(4.1)(b).
65. See id. art. V(C)(1)(b).
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ensuring that the public interest is represented in dispute proceedings,
state-state disputes are preferable to investor-state disputes. If investor-
state arbitration is allowed under the MAI, paragraph b. should read:
A Contracting Party may initiate proceedings under this article for a dispute
which its investor has submitted, or consented to submit, to arbitration
under Article D, at any time up until a final award is rendered in the inves-
tor-state dispute. The investor-state dispute shall be put on hold in such a
case, and the claim of the investor extinguished if an award is granted in the
state-state proceeding.
3. Transparency
Secrecy in decision-making undermines public confidence in and support
for decisions. Any MAI decision-making process should be open and trans-
parent. All persons making submissions in connection with a dispute,
including the parties to a dispute and any experts selected by the dispute
settlement panel, should be required to make available to the public copies
of all their reports and submissions. Such public copies should be made
available at the same time as the official MAI submissions.
General provision A.2 on confidential and proprietary information
66
can be interpreted to allow the suppression of important environmental or
social information. The terms "confidential" and "proprietary" are not
defined. Moreover, the phrase "and which is designated as such by the
Party providing the information" 67 could be interpreted to mean that any-
thing designated as confidential will be considered confidential. The MAI's
dispute system should provide open access to information. Public copies
should be redacted only if, and to the extent that, they contain information
that warrants confidential treatment because it fits within dearly and nar-
rowly defined exceptions to the disclosure presumption. These categories
and their precise definitions should be determined in advance through an
open and transparent decision-making process.
Panel decisions, both preliminary and final, should be made available
to the public at the same time they are released to the disputants. Official
translations should be issued as soon as possible. Hearings before dispute
settlement panels and before the appellate body should be open to the pub-
lic, unless a request is made by a party for in camera treatment of certain
portions of the proceeding.
4. Public Participation
The MAI's dispute resolution system should recognize the right of civil
society as a whole, and not just those of the member states of the MAI, to
participate in the dispute settlement process. Arbitral panels should
encourage and accept amicus curiae briefs from the public in dispute settle-
ment proceedings. This is particularly important in the case of disputes
involving complex, technical, or politically sensitive issues. Upon request,
66. See id. art. V(A)(2).
67. Id.
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the dispute settlement panels and appellate body should permit oral
presentations of the amicus curiae briefs.
The MAI should create a mechanism by which the dispute settlement
panels can adequately consider the views of all parties. Dispute settlement
panels should have adequate staff and support to analyze the facts and the
legal positions. MAI member states should also provide legal services to
member states and other interested parties who lack expertise in MAI rules
or the resources to hire outside counsel. This could be done by maintain-
ing a list of competent counsel, experienced organizations, or other per-
sons willing to provide legal services for little or no remuneration.
Member states should also provide intervenor funding to enable public
interest groups from less developed countries to express their positions to
the MAI dispute settlement.
5. Technical Competence
Many issues, particularly in the area of environmental regulation, are
beyond the technical competence of international arbitral bodies. To ame-
liorate this problem, MAI arbitral panels should seek advisory opinions
from other fora of competent jurisdiction, such as the International Court
of Justice. The MAI should also establish a procedure whereby complex
disputes are referred to another body of competent jurisdiction.
6. Deference to National Sovereigns
When appropriate, the MAI should defer to the laws and regulations of
member states. To this end, the burden of proof in MAI disputes should
weigh heavily on the party seeking to overturn an environmental or social
law or regulation adopted by a member state. Also, the MAI should pro-
vide a standard of review in dispute settlement proceedings that accords
deference to national decisionmakers.
B. Investor-State Procedures
The MAI's investor-state dispute resolution procedures gives investors the
right to sue governments in a variety of international tribunals. 68 Investors
decide when, where, and whether to challenge laws or policies in interna-
tional court.69 There is no governmental mechanism in place to screen
investor claims. The MAI does not set out the standards to be employed by
dispute panelists when adjudicating a case. Thus, the potential impacts of
this dispute resolution process are ambiguous.
The MAI lists three venues for investors to file a claim against a govern-
ment. The first venue, the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID), is part of the World Bank. Nations must be a
member of the ICSID Convention to use the facility.70 Alternatively, if an
MAI signatory nation is not a member of the ICSID, it may use the other
68. See id. art. V(D)(2).
69. See id. art. V(D)(3)(a).
70. See id. art. V(D)(2)(c)(i).
